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STOCK MARKET YIELDS AND THE
PRICING OF MUNICIPAL BONDS
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an alternative to the traditional model for explaining the spread
between taxable and tax-exempt bond yields. This alternative model is a special case of a
general class of clientele models of portfolio choice and asset market equilibrium. In particular,
we consider a setting with two types of investors, a taxable investor and a tax-exempt investor,
who hold specialized bond portfolios. The tax-exempt investor holds only taxable bonds, and
the taxable investor holds only tax-exempt bonds. Both investors hold equity, and the taxable
and tax-exempt bond markets are linked through the equilibrium conditions governing equity
holding and bond holding for each type of investor. In contrast to the traditional model, this
alternative model has the potential to explain the small observed spread between taxable and tax-
exempt yields. In addition, this model predicts that the yield spread between taxable and tax-
exempt bonds should be an increasing function of the dividend yield on corporate stocks.
Although the substantial changes in the tax code during the last four decades complicate the
testing of this model, we find some support for the predicted relationship between the equity
dividend yield and the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds.
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and NBER and NBERWhat determines the yield on tax-exempt municipal bonds relative to the yield on
similar taxable bonds? This paper suggests that factors outside the taxable and tax-exempt
bond markets, in particular the yield on common stocks, may affect this yield spread.
According to the traditional model, the yields on taxable and tax-exempt bonds must adjust
so that, in equilibrium, a taxable investor is indifferent between holding the two kinds of
bonds. This model is the basis for most of the previous studies of yields in the tax-exempt
bond market. Poterba (1 989) offers one survey of this literature; Litzenberger and Nir (1 995)
is a recent example. In this setting, the marginal tax rate on interest income determines the
ratio of the tax-exempt to taxable yield. As a result, relative yields should move with
statutory tax rates. Fortune (1 988), Poterba (1 986), Skelton (1 983), and various other
studies have presented evidence that confirms this prediction.
In this paper we develop an alternative framework for analyzing the relative yields of
tax-exempt and taxable bonds. We move beyond the traditional model, in which there is only
one type of investor with a given tax rate, to consider a model in which there are two types
of investors who face different tax rates and specialize in different kinds of bonds. The first
type of investor is a tax-exempt institution which holds taxable bonds but no tax-exempt
bonds. The second type of investor is a wealthy taxpayer who holds tax-exempt bonds but
no taxable bonds. What links the two bond markets is that both investors hold equities. In
this model, the relative pricing of taxable and tax-exempt bonds is determined by equating
each bond’s after-tax risk-adjusted return, for the investors who hold that type of bond, to
the analogous return on corporate stock. Neither type of investor considers holding both
taxable and tax-exempt bonds, so there are no investors who are indifferent between the
yields on these two types of bonds.
Our model is a simple special case of a more general class of clientele models infinancial economics. In this sense, it is similar in spirit to Green’s (1 993) model of the term
structure in the taxable and tax-exempt bond markets. Green suggests that the standard
comparison between par taxable bonds and par tax-exempt bonds is inappropriate, and he
emphasizes that yields on
advantaged” portfolios of
tax-exempt bonds should be compared with yields on “tax-
taxable bonds. His empirical findings suggest that such
comparisons help to explain the smaller implicit tax rate on longer-term than short-term tax-
exempt bonds. Our analysis also suggests that factors beside the yield on taxable par bonds
affect yields on tax-exempt bonds.
Despite some important differences from the traditional model with a single type of
investor, our model nevertheless shares many of the features of this model. Both models
predict that the yield spread moves with statutory tax rates. Hence, much of the evidence
for the traditional model is also consistent with our alternative model. This alternative model
can, in addition, potentially explain why the yield ratio seems “too small” on average to be
explained by the traditional model. In 1993, for instance, the yield on high-quality long-term
tax-exempt bonds was 87 percent of the yield on similar Treasury bonds. This ratio, together
with the traditional model, implies a marginal tax rate of only 13 percent. By contrast, the
marginal federal into-me tax rate for high-income households was about 40 percent at this
time. Hence, the tax-exempt and taxable yields were too close together to be easily explained
by the traditional view, without introducing other
municipal and Treasury bonds. Our alternative
predicts a narrower yield differential between
traditional model.
factors such as differences in risk between
model can resolve this puzzle because it
taxable and tax-exempt
Our alternative model also predicts that the spread between taxable
yields than the
and tax-exempt
yields will fluctuate with the dividend yield on the stock market. Because dividends and
2capital appreciation are taxed differently, the dividend yield affects the relative tax burden that
taxable investors face on common stocks and, therefore, their required return on tax-exempt
bonds. We test this prediction using time-series data from 1955 to 1994. Although the
results are not completely consistent with the model, we do find evidence that the dividend
yield is related to the spread between taxable and tax-exempt bond yields. This finding
supports our general suggestion that available returns on assets other than taxable bonds may
affect the pricing of tax-exempt bonds.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first develops the framework for our
analysis of yield spreads. The second section documents the substantial differences between
top statutory marginal tax rates and implicit tax rates in the tax-exempt bond market. It also
shows how our alternative model can resolve this puzzle. The third section presents empirical
evidence that the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds is related to the equity
dividend yield. The fourth section is a brief conclusion.
1. The Multiple-Investor Framework
This section describes the standard model of municipal market equilibrium, and then
presents our alternative model. First, we consider a taxable investor with a marginal tax rate
of r. If this investor is to be indifferent
a par tax-exempt municipal bond with
implies
between holding a par taxable bond with yield r~and
yield rM, it must be the case that (1-T)r~ = rM. This
rr - rM - zrT (1)If taxable investors hold both taxable and tax-exempt bonds, then the yield spread should be
set according to this equation. Much of the literature on the municipal bond market has
shown that the tax rate impIied by this equation in fact moves with statutory marginal tax
rates. This evidence provides some support for this model, but as we will see, it may be
consistent with other models as well.
We now develop an alternative model by introducing a second class of investors: tax-
exempt institutions. Because tax-exempt bonds earn a lower return than taxable bonds, no
tax-exempt investor holds them. At the same time, because the spread between the yields
on taxable and tax-exempt bonds is so small, no taxable investor holds taxable bonds. This
model is thus related to the “preferred habitat” models of asset-market equilibrium that have
been proposed in various contexts.
Consider the equilibrium conditions for each type of investor. A tax-exempt investor
compares the return on stock with the return on bonds Plus an equity risk premium. If d is
the dividend yield, g the
investor earns the same
expected capital gain, and 0 the risk premium, then the tax-exempt
risk-adjusted return on taxable bonds and stocks when
rT+O-d+g. (2)
A taxable investor compares the tax-exempt bond yield with the after-tax return on stocks.
If ~q is the tax rate on capital gains, then the taxable
r~ + (1 - Tq)# - (1 - t)d
investor’s equilibrium condition is
+ (1 - Tcg)g (3)
where (I- rq)e’ is the taxable investor’s after-tax risk premium on equity. Note that we
assume that taxable and tax-exempt investors have the same expectations regarding capital
gains. In addition, we assume that the equity risk premium falls as the tax rate on capital
gains rises, because the government takes on some of the risk through capital-gains taxation.
4We can solve for r~ - r~using the equilibrium conditions for the taxable and tax-exempt
investors. By subtracting equation (3) from equation (2), we obtain
rr - rM - [(l-tq)w - e] + f d + Cc,g. (4)
This expression depends on g, the expected capital gain on equities, which is not observable.
We can, however, rearrange equation (2) to solve for g and substitute into equation (4). We
obtain
(5)
This expression shows that the spread between taxable and tax-exempt yields should depend
on both the taxable bond yield and the equity dividend yield. The coefficient on the bond yield
is the capital-gains tax rate, not the interest-income tax rate. The difference between the
interest and capital-gains tax rates multiplies the dividend yield.
In the alternative model summarized in equation (5), the yield spread is an increasing
function of the tax rate on interest income, so the previously cited evidence that tax policy
affects the yield spread is consistent with the current model. The mechanism by which the
interest tax rate affects the yield spread, however, is quite different than in the traditional
model. In the two-investor case, the tax rate on interest affects the yield spread between
taxable and tax-exempt bonds because it determines the tax burden on dividends, which is
part of the return on one of the taxable alternatives to tax-exempt bonds.
Data on portfolio holdings provide some support for the notion of a clientele equilibrium
in the tax-exempt bond market. At the end of 1992, the most recent period for which it is
possible to disaggregate households and nonprofit institutions in the Federal Reserve Board
Flow of Funds accounts, households held $581.1 billion in municipal securities directly. They
also heId additional tax-exempt debt through mutual funds. Nonprofits, which are tax-exempt,held only $0.1 billion of such securities. Households held $182.8 billion of taxable Treasury
securities, and another $157.3 billion in savings bonds, while nonprofits held $110.9 billion
of taxable Treasuries. Both nonprofits and households report substantial holdings of corporate
equities.
The notion that tax-exempt institutions compare taxable bonds and equities is fully
consistent with these portfolio data. The portfolio pattern exhibited by households is more
difficult to interpret. Although households hold more tax-exempt bonds than taxable bonds,
they nonetheless hold substantial amounts of taxable bonds, which appears inconsistent with
our stylized model. It is possible, however, that holdings of taxable debt are concentrated in
tax-deferred investment vehicles such as Individual Retirement Accounts and Keogh plans.
In this case, household ownership of taxable bonds is consistent with the model.
We should note that the ownership pattern of tax-exempt debt is very different today
than it was twenty years ago. When Fama (1 977) suggested that commercial banks were
the marginal investors in all short-term municipal obligations, and that the pricing of these
bonds depended on the tax rates of these banks, commercial banks were major investors in
this market. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 limited banks’ ability to invest in tax-exempt
securities and borrow the principal in a tax-deductible way, the role of commercial banks in
this market has declined. Households have become the largest holders of tax-exempt debt
in the ten years since the 1986 act.
The changing pattern of municipal-bond ownership poses a challenge to testing models
of yield determination. If details of the tax code and financial regulations determine the set
of investors for whom holding tax-exempt bonds is a viable option, and if these rules change
over time, then it may be problematic to find a sufficiently long time series to permit careful
testing of these models. Alternatively, if shifts in marginal tax rates coincide with shifts in
6the identity of investors in the municipal bond market, there may be changes in risk premia
and other factors that confound econometric testing. We consider these issues further below.
2. The Implicit Tax Puzzle
Motivated by the traditional model, economists often summarize the yield differential
between taxable and tax-exempt bonds by the imr)licit tax ratQthat equates the after-tax yield
from a taxable and tax-exempt security. This implicit tax rate ~ is (r~ - r~)/r~, where the two
yields are for securities with similar characteristics.
A standard source of information on the yield curve for taxable and tax-exempt
securities is Salomon Brothers’ Analytical Record of Yields and Yield S~read~, which presents
estimates of yield curves for par bonds on the first of each month. Like many studies of the
determinants of the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, including Buser and
Hess (1 986), Poterba (1 986), and Kochin and Parks (1 988), we focus on the spread between
newly issued Treasury securities and prime-grade general obligation tax-exempt bonds.
“Prime” is the least risky category of municipal bonds presented in the Salomon Brothers data,
so both the taxable and tax-exempt rates are close to riskless. Chalmers (1 995) examines
data on pre-defeased-municipal bonds and presents striking evidence that default risks do not
explain the pricing of high-quality municipal and taxable bonds.
Table 1 shows annual averages of the twelve monthly implicit tax rates for 20-year
bonds. We focus on yield spreads for long-term bonds, which have almost always exhibited
a smaller implicit tax rate than short-term bonds. At some points in the late 1960s and early
1980s, the difference between the implicit tax rates on one- and twenty-year bonds exceeded
twenty-five percentage points. The upward slope of the tax-exempt term structure has
sometimes been steep enough to imply future short-term municipal rates greater than those
7suggested by the taxable term structure; see Kochin and Parks (1988).
The data in Table 1 show that the implicit tax rate on these bonds has historically been
low, and that it declined substantially during the 1980s. In 1980, the implicit tax rate was
32.4 percent. Since individual investors could face marginal tax rates as high as 70 percent
on taxable interest income, the implicit tax rate was well below the top tax rate. The implicit
tax rate on twenty-year bonds declined to 20.0 percent in 1990, and subsequently fell to an
average value of 13.0 percent in 1993. The top federal marginal tax rate on individual
investors in 1993 was 39.6 percent, again much higher than the implicit tax rate.
Our alternative model also allows the computation of an implicit tax rate, although such
a computation requires more assumptions. In patiicular, suppose that the two investors place
the same risk premium on equity (0 = d’) and that capital gains are not taxed (r- = O). Then
the implicit tax rate r is (r~ - r~)/d. We call this the @alternativeimc)licit tax ratQ. For a given
yield spread, the alternative model implies a much larger implicit tax rate, because the
dividend yield is normally much below the taxable bond yield. Conversely, for any given tax
rate, the alternative model predicts a much smaller spread rT- r~.
Table 1 also presents the time series of the alternative implicit tax rate. This
alternative implicit t= rate is consistently higher than the traditional implicit tax rate and,
therefore, closer to statutory tax rates. In the years since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the
alternative implicit tax rate has ranged between 29.4 percent (1 993) and almost 60 percent
(1987). In some cases, both in this period and before, the alternative implicit tax rate is
greater than the highest statutory marginal tax rate on interest and dividend income. This
finding may reflect our extreme assumption that the effective capital-gains tax rate is zero.
More generally, our computed value for the alternative implicit tax rate, (r~ - r~)/d, should
equal ~ + (r~/d -1 )Tq, which is greater than the tax rate on dividends r. Like the implicit tax
8rate computed under the standard model, the alternative implicit tax rate declines during the
1980s, but the level of the alternative implicit tax rate does not fall substantially below
statutory marginal tax rates.
Our discussion of the alternative implicit tax rate is not designed to supplant the use
of the traditional implicit tax rate. The traditional implicit tax rate measures the tax rate at
which an individual investor would be indifferent between holding a taxable and tax-exempt
bond, and this is often a useful construct. However, under our assumption that taxable
investors who hold tax-exempt bonds are not investing at the margin in taxable bonds, this
calculation does not convey information on the marginal tax rates of the investors who are
setting prices in the tax-exempt bond market.
3. Regression Evidence
To compare the traditional model and our alternative model of municipal bond yields,
it seems natural to regress the yield spread r~- r~ on the taxable bond yield r~ and the equity
dividend yield d. That is, we consider regression models of the form:
rr - rM-6+a*rr+fl*d+e (6)
Note that this regression nests the traditional model (equation 1) and our alternative model
(equation 5) if tax rates and risk premia are held constant. For any given set of tax rates, the
two models give precise predictions about the magnitude of the coefficients in this regression.
According to the traditional model, a = Tand # = O, where ~is a marginal tax rate on interest
income. According to the alternative model, a = T=and B = ~ - ~=, where r= is the effective
marginal tax rate on capital gains. The theory developed above suggests that d = (1 -T~)(O’ -
8), the difference in the after-tax risk premia that taxable and tax-exempt investors demand
for holding equities.As we noted above, estimation of such a regression would convey the most
information if it were conducted during a period when the regulations affecting who could
profitably own tax-exempt bonds were stable, but when interest rates and dividend yields
varied substantially. Such a data sample’ is not available. Nonetheless, to get a rough gauge
of the validity of the two models, we try estimating this regression for the sample periods that
are available, even though they span tax reforms and other changes in the tax-exempt bond
market.
An important issue concerns the interpretation of the error term c in the regression.
Within the model we are examining, this error term arises if there are differential changes in
the risk premia on equity or if there are changes in tax rates. The key question for
identification is whether this error is correlated with either the taxable bond yield or the
dividend yield.
There are at least three ways in which such correlation might emerge. First, if changes
in the dividend yield are correlated with changes in the required risk premia on corporate
equity, then the coefficient on d will reflect more than simply the difference between the tax
rates on dividend income and capital gains. The net effect of this bias is not clear, for it
depends on correlation of the dividend yield with the difference in risk premia between the
two investor types.
A second source of potential bias arises from the effect of changes in d on the
marginal tax rates of investing households. If fluctuations in the dividend yield are attributable
to changes in dividend payments, and an increase in aggregate dividends raises the taxable
income of some investing households enough to increase their marginal tax rates, then
increases in d will raise the yield spread by more than the asset-market equilibrium conditions
imply. This will lead the coefficient on d to overstate the actual differential in margi:, al tax
10rates. This effect is unlikely to be large, however. If the taxable investors who are holding
both corporate equities and tax-exempt bonds face the top marginal tax bracket, then this
effect does not operate. Moreover, because most of the variation in d is attributable to
fluctuations in share prices, not changes in dividends, a relatively small share of the variation
in d is likely to be associated with changes in investor marginal tax rates.
A third effect that warrants consideration is a relationship between marginal tax rates
and dividend payout. Poterba (1 987) presents some evidence from the U.S. time series, and
cites other studies, suggesting that when the differential between the tax rate on dividends
and that on capital gains rises, firms reduce their payout ratios. This would suggest that an
increase in ~which raises the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds would also
reduce d, thereby leading to a negative bias in the estimate of ~.
Although these concerns suggest some caution in interpreting the regression evidence,
we nonetheless proceed in estimating the equation (6) as a first step in evaluating the
alternative model. We use monthly data for the period 1955:1-1994:12. The results are
shown in Table 2. The first three rows present estimates for the full sample period, while the
last three rows correspond to the period 1982:1-1994:12, the period after the top marginal
tax rate on unearned income was reduced from 70 to 50 percent in the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981.
In bivariate regressions that include either the taxable bond yield or the dividend-price
ratio, each of these variables has a positive and statistically significant correlation with the
yield spread. The explanatory power of the equation that includes the dividend yield is smaller
than that of the equation with the taxable yield. If we exclude the 1950s from our sample
period, the explanatory power of the two equations is roughly equal, and for some sample
periods, the yield spread is more strongly correlated with the dividend yield than with the
11taxable bond yield.
When both the taxable bond yield (r~) and the dividend yield (d) are included in the
estimation equation, as in equation (6), each variable has a statistically significant effect on
the yield spread (r~ - r~). Recall that the traditional model of municipal bond pricing predicts
a coefficient of zero on the equity dividend yield. The data decisively reject that restriction.
The resulting estimates can be used to compute the implied values of the dividend tax
rate, r, and the effective capital-gains tax rate, ~~, under the assumption our alternative model
is correct. The implied value of T is 48.6 percent, while the implied value of ~= is 17.0
percent. Keep in
code, but rather
mind that these are not estimates of the tax rate under any particular tax
estimates based on forty years of data that span several tax regimes.
Viewed in this light, the estimates seem reasonable. The effect iv~ capital-gains tax rate has
long been recognized to fall well below the statutory tax rate; Feldstein and Summers (1 979)
divided the statutory rate by four to allow for the effects of deferral of realization, and basis
step-up at death. The estimated dividend tax rate of nearly fifty percent is somewhat higher
than the top statutory marginal tax rate in the post-1 986 period, but is well within the range
of marginal tax rates in earlier years.
The last three~ows of Table 2 present estimates of the same equation for the 1982:1-
1994:12 time period. Because marginal tax rates vary less in this period than between this
period and earlier years, we thought that the regression might work better for these years
alone. This conjecture, however, was not confirmed. The regression results suggest that the
coefficients are not stable over time. When we relate the yield spread to either the taxable
bond yield or the dividend yield in a bivariate regression, the coefficient estimates continue
to be positive and statistically significant. When both variables are included together,
however, the coefficient estimate on the taxable bond yield is positive and that on the
12dividend yield is negative (and statistically significant).
The subsample instability in Table 2 calls attention to our aggregation of data from
many different tax regimes. Therefore, we next consider specifications that allow for
variation in tax rates over time. In particular, we estimate
(7)
we use the correct marginal tax rates for the investors
asset markets, then the alternative model predicts
construct variables based on the marginal tax rates
If our alternative model is correct and if
who are determining prices in these
coefficient estimates of u’ = B’ = 1.
To estimate this equation, we
facing highest-income individuals. We use two measures of the effective capital-gains tax
rate: the statutory rate and one quarter of the statutory rate. As we noted earlier, the latter
approach is used by Feldstein and Summers (1 979) to allow for the effects of deferral of
realization and basis step-up at death. We then construct synthetic variables by multiplying
these tax parameters by the return on taxable bonds and the dividend yields. We use these
synthetic variables in the above regression.
The results are in Table 3. In some ways, the results are supportive of the model. In
all cases, the coefficients are statistically significant and of the correct sign. For the entire
sample, the fit is better than for the comparable regression in Table 2, which implicitly
assumes constant tax rates. Moreover, the results are more robust over subsamples. On the
other hand, the coefficients are not always of the right magnitude. In particular, the
coefficient on the dividend-yield variable, although always positive and significant, is less than
the value of unity predicted by the alternative theory.
134. Conclusion
Traditional analyses of how taxes affect the yield spread between taxable and tax-
exempt bonds have assumed that a single class of taxable investors is indifferent between
holding these two securities. This paper has proposed and examined an alternative model of
the pricing of municipal bonds, in which there is heterogeneity in investor type and
segmentation in the bond market. Taxable investors hold tax-exempt bonds, while tax-exempt
investors hold taxable bonds. What links the investors, and the two bond markets, is that
both investors hold equities. The model generates the novel prediction that the spread
between taxable and tax-exempt bond yields depends on the dividend yield paid by equities,
as well as on the taxable interest rate and on the marginal tax rates for dividends and capital
gains. The time-series data gives some support to this prediction, although the results are not
completely consistent with the simple model presented here.
One natural extension of the model developed here would allow for investors who can
hold assets in both taxable and tax-exempt form. Individual investors with access to
Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans, 401 (k) accounts, or similar investment vehicles
can reduce their tax burden by allocating assets among accounts according to their tax
characteristics. Such-a model can potentially explain some of the anomalous results reported
here. In Table 3, for example, we reported that the equity dividend yield, adjusted by the tax
rate, has a significant impact on the spread between taxable and tax-exempt bond yields, but
that the size of the effect is smaller than the model predicts. Perhaps the explanation is that
individuals hold low-dividend stocks in their taxable account and high-dividend stocks in their
tax-exempt account. Such behavior would lower the effective tax rate on dividends and, as
a result, reduce the impact of the dividend yield on the spread between bond yields.
The generaI lesson from our analysis is the importance of considering assets other than
14taxable bonds when modelling the yield on municipal bonds. In this sense, we have built on
the analysis of Green (1 993), who considers a model with various kinds of taxable bonds,
some selling at par and others selling below par. In his model, tax-exempt bonds are
arbitraged to yield returns comparable to those on favorably-taxed taxable bonds, not par
bonds. Our analysis shares the insight that explaining the pricing of tax-favored securities
may be easier if one expands the set of assets that investors are able to hold. Yet it also
suggests that for analyzing the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, it may
be important to consider developments in equity as well as fixed-income markets.
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IMPLICIT TAX RATES FROM TAXABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT BOND MARKETS
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SalomonBrothers’Analytical Reco rd of
Yields and Yield S~readS, and dividend yield information from Standard and Poor’s. The
entries in the first column correspond to the marginal interest income tax rate of the investor
who is indifferent between taxable and tax-exempt bonds under the assumptions of the
traditional model; the entries in the second are the marginal tax rates on interest and dividend
income of the marginal taxable investor who is indifferent between equity and tax-exempt
bonds, assuming a zero capital-gains tax rate. See text for further discussion.TABLE 2:
DETERMINANTS OF THE YIELD SPREAD BETWEEN TAXABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT BONDS
Dependent Variable: (r~ - r~)
--------------------------------------- ---------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Sample Constant r~ d Adj. R2 SER





































---------------------------- ................................... ................. ........................... ..........
Notes: Estimation results using monthly data from the beginning of the first calendar year
indicated, through December 1994. Standard errors shown in parentheses are estimated
using the Newey-West (1994) algorithm to preserve consistency under autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is the yield spread between the 20-year taxable
bond yield (r~) and the 20-year tax-exempt bond yield (r~) as reported in Salomon Brothers’
Analytical Record of Yields and Yield SoreadS. d is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 for the
Wednesday closest to the first of each month.
19TABLE 3:
D~ERMINANTS OF THE YIELD SPREAD BETWEEN TAXABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT BONDS
Dependent Variable: (r~ - r~)
......................................- ..........-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Sample Constant T- l r~ (~-~w)”d Adj. R2 SER
----------------------------- ------------------------------------- --------------- ---------------------------------------
Using Top Capital Gains Rate
55-94 -1.016 1.021 0.402 .724 .436
(0.243) (0.092) (0.074)
82-94 -1.033 1.011 0.604 .671 .355
(0.485) (0.200) (0.162)
Using 1/4 Top Capital Gains Rate
55-94 -1.000 3.748 0.329 .714 .444
(0.252) (0.337) (0.067)
82-94 -1.116 3.578 0.557 .637 .373
(0.530) (0.707) (0.170)
-. ----- ...............---------------------- .................................-. .-.. -—----------------------------------
Notes: Estimation results using monthly data from the beginning of the first calendar year
indicated, through December 1994. Standard errors shown in parentheses are estimated
using the Newey-West (1 994) algorithm to preserve consistency under autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is the yield spread between the 20-year taxable
bond yield (r~) and the 20-year tax-exempt bond yield (r~) as reported in Salomon Brothers’
Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Soread~. d is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 for the
Wednesday closest to the first of each month.
20